Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Truth Theory, philosophy: In truth theories, the question is whether and how truth is to be defined. Roughly differentiated are
A. Theories on the correspondence of statements with facts (correspondence theories).
B. Theories of internal consistency within a system of statements (coherence theories).
See also truth definition, truth, truth values, truth predicate, deflationism, disquotationalism, disquotation.
_____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Hartry Field on Truth Theory - Dictionary of Arguments
II 21 Truth-Theory/Truth-Definition/TarskiVsField: semantic concepts are not necessary and not philosophically interesting for a T-theory. >Semantics. FieldVsTarski: Tarski has only lists for denotation: (e)(a) (e is a name which denotes a) ⇔ (e is "c1" and a is c1) or (e is "c2" and a is c2) or ... II 24 Truth-Theory/utterance conditions/Truth/T-theory/Quine: (Quine, 1953b(1), p. 138) the conditions of expression are all that is needed to make the concept "true" clear. - (Field dito). E.g. Alabama-Example: a friend says that in the southern state of Alabama is snow which is a foot high. - Therefore, utterance conditions are important. Question: why do we need causal theories of the reference beyond the Truth-schema? - That does not work anyway, since we are on Neurath's ship. ((s). That is, meanings change in the course of language development). >Language evolution, >Meaning change, >Meaning. Still: Solution/Field: psychological models about the (inner) connection to reality. - (Do not attach a theory from the outside). - This psychological connection is still physical. 1. W.V.O. Quine 1953. "Notes on the theory of reference". In: From al Logical Point of View. New York: Harper._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Truth Theory
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28